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A. Introduction 
Overtime, especially after the Second World War, fundamental rights have gained more 
importance than ever. The legislatures have broadened the list, by adopting and legally 
protecting a wider range of fundamental rights. But more importantly, the ample interpretation 
of the legislation by the Courts made a much more generous contribution in establishing an 
immense catalogue.1 
For example the United States Supreme Court has added rights through its interpretation, 
which were not explicitly enlisted in the Bill of Rights, such as the right to vote,2 the right to 
privacy3 and the right to an abortion. 4 
Fundamental rights were initially adopted into the legislation to protect the individuals from 
the state and its powers.5 “They are designed to protect the individual from unwarranted 
interference in crucial aspects of her life.”6 But in time the aspect of fundamental rights have 
changed. Apart from the duty to respect fundamental rights of individuals, the State also 
carries the obligation, namely the positive obligation, to protect them from each other. “This 
positive obligation to provide protection presupposes the adoption of legislative, 
administrative, judicial and substantive measures to protect individuals against violation of 
their fundamental rights by other individuals. It leads necessarily to an increase in the 
number of actions founded on the violation of individual freedoms and as a result, to an 
escalation in the number of conflicts between fundamental rights.”7 The State is not only 
obliged to respect the fundamental rights of the individuals, but also has to protect their rights 
from being violated by other individuals as well. 
With the increase in the number of fundamental rights protected, it is inevitable to come 
across clashes in between such a long list. “Occasions for conflict among rights multiply as 
                                                          
1
 For example Article 8 of the ECHR, Right to Respect Private Life; another important example would 
be how the ECJ, with its case-law, incorporated fundamental rights into Union Law, before the Charter 
existed. See ECJ, case C-29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm – Sozialamt, ECR 1969, I-00419; ECJ, case 
C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel, ECR 1970, I-01125; ECJ, case C-4/73, J. Nold Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v 
Commission of the European Communities, ECR 1977, I-00001 and ECJ, case C-5/88, Hubert 
Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaf, ECR 1989, I-02609. 
2
 Briffault, Review: The Contested Right to Vote, Michigan Law Review 2002, pp. 1521–1522. 
3
 Griswold v Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 85 S Ct 1678 (1965). 
4
 Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, (1973). 
5
 Cherednychenko, Fundamental Rights, Contract Law and the Protection of the Weaker Party: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Constitutionalisation of Contract Law, with Emphasis on Risky Financial 
Transactions, 2007, p. 241. 
6
 Smet, Freedom of Expression and the Right to Reputation: Human Rights in Conflict, in: American 
University International Law Review 2010, p. 184. 
7
 Bribosia and Rorive, In the Search of a Balance Between the Right to Equality and other 
Fundamental Rights, European Commision, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Equal Opportunities, Unit G.2, 2010, p. 14. 
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catalogs of rights grow longer.” 8  It is somehow an intriguing situation to see, how the 
possibility of a conflict to occur increases, when the level and scope of the protection of 
fundamental rights become stronger. It is more common than ever, to come across situations 
where two fundamental rights, or maybe sometimes even more than two, go head to head. 
The essential question here is, how does one solve a conflict between fundamental rights?  
B. What is a Conflict of Fundamental Rights? 
I.    Definition 
Before moving on to the question of how to resolve these conflicts, the first step is to 
understand what they are. Without defining the nature of the conflict, it will not be possible to 
find a clear path on how to solve it.  
Conflict of fundamental rights means the existence of one right is pushing the other one out 
of the picture. As Zucca writes; “Whichever way you look at it, you are going to lose 
something fundamental. A constitutional dilemma typically involves two elements: a choice 
between two separate goods (or evils) protected by fundamental rights; a fundamental loss 
of a good protected by a fundamental right no matter what the decision involves.”9  
Keeping both fundamental rights intact is simply impossible. The presence of one right is 
causing the other right to partially or completely fade away.  
After the definition, Zucca also points out that there is a distinction of “spurious or genuine” 
conflicts.10 Spurious conflicts are not actually conflicts of fundamental rights. They either 
appear to be a conflict on the first sight and after close examination it can be seen that the 
issue is actually not about fundamental rights, or a different angle to the problem will solve 
the conflict without disturbing any one of them.  
When there is no possibility of solving the conflict without limiting the benefits given to an 
individual by a fundamental right, there is a conflict, or as Zucca summarizes: Constitutional 
Dilemmas. 
II.   Relativity of the Definition 
Another question which is crucial in the definition of a conflict is what is a fundamental right? 
Without going into much detail, it needs to be pointed out that this concept has a feature that 
                                                          
8
 Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse, 1991, p. 16. 
9
 Zucca, Conflicts of Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Dilemmas, in Brems (Ed.), Conflicts 
Between Fundamental Rights, 2008, p. 20. 
10
 Ibid. pp. 23-26. 
6 
 
is influenced by several elements. Depending on traditions, culture, politics, religion, 
historical background and many other factors, the concept of fundamental rights will be open 
to some amount of divergence in each society.  
“As different legal orders grant different rights, have divergent understandings of what these 
rights are supposed to protect, adopt different substantive standards for the protection of 
these rights or use alternative conceptualizations to frame similar conflicts of interests and 
values, the proportion of conflicts between interests and/or values expressed in terms of 
‘conflict of fundamental rights’ will vary as between them.”11  
Based on the perception of ‘fundamental rights’ there will be differences as to what is defined 
as a conflict and what is not. Although there is a common group of fundamental rights that 
most legal orders accept and protect, the scope of the same fundamental right might, 
nevertheless, alter. And even the slightest alteration in the understanding of one fundamental 
right could lead to a totally different answer when resolving the same conflict in different legal 
orders. 
In Europe, through the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
environmental protection has gained some level of fundamental rights protection.12 On the 
contrary, in the United States, environmental interests of an individual would not be 
expressed as a conflicting fundamental right.13 
The Supreme Court of the United States found that the inflammatory racist speech of the Ku 
Klux Klan members was protected by the First Amendment’s freedom of speech and did not 
conflict with any fundamental right of Holocaust survivors and African-Americans not to 
encounter expressions which at the very least cause emotional suffering.14 Meanwhile in 
Germany, the game of Laser-Tag was found to violate human dignity, since it was promoting 
the playful killing of human beings.15 On the one hand a mere game is found to violate a 
fundamental right of willing adults who voluntarily participate in the game, on the other hand 
the public discriminatory and offensive statements of a racist group are found not to violate 
any fundamental rights at all.  
                                                          
11
 Bomhoff, ‘The Rights and Freedom of Others’: The ECHR and Its Peculiar Category of Conflicts 
Between Individual Fundamental Rights, in Brems (ed.), Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights, 2008, 
p. 628. 
12
 ECtHR, application no. 16798/90, Lopez Ostra v. Spain, judgment of 9 December 1994 
13
 Bomhoff, (fn. 11), p. 629. 
14
 Brandenburg v Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
15
 ECJ, Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaustellungs GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin 
der Bundesstadt Bonn, ECR 2004, I-09609. Although this case is about a conflict between a 
fundamental right and a fundamental freedom provided by the EU Law, and not a conflict between two 
constitutional fundamental rights, it is nevertheless given as an example here, since it illustrates and 
gives a clue about the difference in the interpretation and the scope of fundamental rights. 
7 
 
The approach towards the headscarf mostly used by Muslim women shows how the same 
situation can be resolved differently in different legal systems. In the United States, the 
headscarf has never been a public problem or subject to banishment. Despite the difficulties 
the American Muslims went through after 9/11, it did not take the society long time to restore 
their unity in diversity again. Meanwhile in Europe, the view is quite different. The ban on 
headscarves in schools was not seen to be in violation of the freedom of religion or 
expression by the ECtHR in the cases of Dogru v. France16 and Leyla Sahin v. Turkey. 17 
The distinction of the concept lies within the nature and backgrounds of the legal orders. 18  
On the one hand, there is a nation which has the motto of “In God we trust” and is known for 
its “religiosity”.19 On the other hand there are two states which established their secularism 
either after the disempowerment of the Catholic Church or the abolition of the Caliphate. 
Obviously the history of a state also has an effect on the interpretation of fundamental rights 
and their limitations.  
Thus the importance of the scope of each fundamental right is crucial when searching for a 
solution to the conflict. The nature of the legal order where the conflict has occurred, as seen 
in the examples, will highly affect the outcome. One should keep in mind and consider such 
influences when dealing with a conflict, knowing that not always a common answer for the 
problem will be available. 
C. Methodology to Resolve a Conflict 
I.    Ranking Fundamental Rights 
As a solution to conflicts of fundamental rights, there have been attempts in the literature to 
find a hierarchy. If ranking the fundamental rights in an order of precedence could be 
achieved, then resolving a conflict between them would not be problematic, since the higher 
ranking right would override the other. For example a common view in the past was that, civil 
and political rights would come before economic and social rights.20 
But the problem is that, human rights instruments do not provide a hierarchy between 
fundamental rights. Other then the division of “absolute rights” and “relative rights”, there is 
no indication of a ranking among fundamental rights. Absolute rights are “rights or principles 
which are in no circumstances subject to any limitation by the state and reconciliation with 
                                                          
16
 ECtHR, application no. 27058/05, Dogru v. France, judgment of 4 December 2008. 
17
ECtHR, application no. 44774/98, Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, judgment of 10 November 2005. 
18
 For further analysis on this matter see, Gordon, Why Is There No Headscarf Affair in the United 
States?, Historical Reflections, 2008, pp. 37-60. 
19
 Elver, The Headscarf Controversy: Secularism and Freedom of Religion, 2012, p. 161.  
20
 Xu and Wilson, On Conflict of Human Rights, Pierce Law Review 2006 (Vol. 5), p. 42. 
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other rights”,21 such as human dignity.  Relative rights on the other hand, are “rights which 
can be limited by law in the interest of others or public order”, 22  such as freedom of 
expression.  
Absolute rights under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) are, for example, 
the freedom from torture, slavery and forced labor and the right not to be subject to 
punishment without law. These rights cannot be derogated from in a state of emergency 
(Article 15 ECHR). It can be said that the absolute rights have more weight than relative 
rights in case of a conflict.  
Some scholars argue that rights which have a closer tie with “generally recognized human 
values”,23 such as the right to privacy, override other fundamental rights, such as the right to 
property. Despite the fact that some of the fundamental rights are within the core of an 
individual’s identity, which at the first sight would give them a higher ranking, does not mean 
that other rights are less important to the interests of that individual. 
In a follow-up to the division of absolute-relative rights, a group of scholars24 have searched 
for an implied hierarchy established by the framers of the respective fundamental rights 
catalogue within the limitation clauses for the purpose of ranking the relative rights. After 
prioritizing the absolute rights on the top, they try to maintain a ranking between relative 
rights based on the differences in the wording of their limitation clauses. Nevertheless, the 
helpfulness of such a differentiation is questionable. 
Despite all the attempts made, no common understanding of a hierarchy has been 
established. There simply is no commonly agreed system which can be used to rank the 
rights.25 
The former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, thus 
stated: 
“Divisions and ranking of rights is artificial. When President Roosevelt spoke of the famous 
“four freedoms,” freedom from want stood equally alongside freedom from fear. Human rights 
will not be truly achieved until all accept economic, social and cultural rights as rights that 
deserve and require equal attention to civil and political rights and freedoms. This imperative 
was endorsed by over 170 states at the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, 1993: 
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and inter-related. The 
                                                          
21
 Cherednychenko, (fn. 5) p. 241. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Cherednychenko, (fn. 5) p. 242 - (see footnote 132). 
24
 For an example in German literature see, Blaesing, Grundrechtskollisionen, 1974, p. 143 ff. 
25
 Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, American Journal of International Law, 1986, 
pp. 21-22. 
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international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the 
same footing, and with the same emphasis.”26 
It is true that all human rights should be upheld with equal determination, since “all rights are 
inter-related, indivisible and have equal status. One group of rights is not more important 
than another and all rights – whether civil, political, economic, social or cultural – must be 
equally respected.”27  
But when looking at the essence of the rights, some of them are bound to show a higher 
level of importance, but only in the context of a conflict.  
It is also questionable how useful a theoretical ranking of fundamental constitutional rights 
would be. Would it really solve the problem? Would ranking fundamental rights give a single 
solid solution for all conflicts? What if a severe infringement of a lower ranking right was 
necessary in order to avoid a slight infringement of a higher ranking fundamental right? Is an 
absolute sacrifice of a right justified in such a case? 
The answer to this question could hardly be affirmative. Although a theoretical hierarchy 
among fundamental rights might be helpful when resolving the conflict, their importance in 
the context and facts of the conflict is much more relevant than their theoretical classification. 
II.   Sacrificing Equally 
Based on the view that all rights are equal and must be given the same level of value, some 
scholars suggested making equal sacrifice from all of the conflicting fundamental rights, so 
that an equal treatment could be established. This utilitarian view is explained as follows; 
“Conflicts between these prima facie rights might be handled by a utilitarianism of rights, so 
that what would count as the ideally just arrangement would be that in which total right-
fulfillment was maximized, or total right-infringement minimized. Alternatively, they might be 
handled by assuming that ideally, one person’s rights should not be infringed more than 
another’s. Again the two methods are not even extensionally equivalent, and again I suggest 
that the second is the more attractive. Such equality of sacrifice in compromises between our 
Lockean rights is, of course, not equivalent to the equal need-satisfaction in our second 
reading of the Marxist slogan, precisely because our rights include each individual’s private 
property in his own body, energy, talents, and labor, and because each has a prima facie 
                                                          
26
 Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Second Annual BP Lecture on 
Human Rights and Global Civilisation http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/ 
0/AFD931913249074EC1256B17002C27BF?opendocument, 29.11.2001. 
27
 Desai, A Rights-Based Preventative Approach for Psychosocial Well-being in Childhood, Children’s 
Well-being: Indicators and Research, 2010, p. 43. 
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right to be free and to pursue happiness in whatever way he chooses, doubtless with very 
varying degrees of success.”28 
So no matter which two fundamental rights are in question, both parties should forfeit equal 
amount of their interests to resolve the conflict. 
Applying equal treatment to all rights does not in fact mean equality and justice. A strict 
equality approach does not always bring a reasonable solution. The ECtHR’s opinion on 
Article 14, the prohibition of discrimination, in the Thlimmenos v Greece case gives the idea 
of what real equality should be like: 
“The right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the 
Convention is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail 
to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different.”29 
Equality cannot mean that all rights have the same weight, no matter under what 
circumstances. Just the mere fact that some rights can be derogated from or legitimately 
limited in certain situations necessitates an equality approach in compliance with the 
Thlimmenos v Greece case, which does not amount to equality in the strictly formal sense.  
In the Belgian Linguistics case, the ECtHR emphasized the importance of special factors in 
the concept of equality as follows; 
“… Article 14 does not forbid every difference in treatment in the exercise of the rights and 
freedoms recognized. …The competent national authorities are frequently confronted with 
situations and problems which, on account of differences inherent therein, call for different 
legal solutions; moreover, certain legal inequalities tend only to correct factual inequalities.”30 
The utilitarian view is a “compromise formula that would, when conflicts among rights arise, 
infringe all people’s rights equally and therefore dehumanize them all. Not all equal treatment 
is ipso facto fair treatment: a tyrant may boil all his subjects in oil.”31 Although all fundamental 
rights are equally important, they do not necessarily carry equal weight in every situation. So 
sacrificing both parties’ interests to an equal amount cannot be the answer on how to resolve 
conflicts between fundamental rights. 
 
                                                          
28
 Mackie, Rights, Utility and Universalization, in Frey (Ed), Utility and Rights, 1985, pp. 88-89.  
29
 ECtHR, application no. 34369/97, Thlimmenos v. Greece, judgment of 6 April 2000, para. 44. 
30
 ECtHR, application no. 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64, Case “Relating to 
Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium” v. Belgium (Merits), 
(Belgian Linguistcs), judgment of 23 July 1968, para. 10. 
31
 Freeden, Rights, 1991, p. 99. 
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III.  Calculating the Weight of the Fundamental Rights 
The importance of a fundamental right is a relative concept. As explained before, it would 
depend also on the characteristics of the legal system. So when doing the calculation, one 
should keep in mind the influential elements of the respective legal order.  
“The weight of a right is a determination, sometimes explicit and sometimes not, sometimes 
quite exact and sometimes rather imprecise, of how it stands with respect to other normative 
considerations and whether it would give way to them, or they to it, in cases of conflict.”32 
When evaluating the weight, the scope and the strictness of the right should be examined. 
Here, the separation of absolute rights and relative rights would be relevant. The 
fundamental rights which, under cannot be limited or derogated from under any 
circumstances, would weigh heavier in relation to the fundamental rights which can in certain 
situations, be subject to limitation.  
The relationship of a fundamental right with the others is of course a relevant aspect at this 
point.  
But what happens if the conflict is between two individuals‘ interests that are protected under 
the same right? An example, given by Zucca33, would be the case of the conjoined twins, in 
which the right to of the twins are in conflict, since to save one of them requires a surgery 
that would kill the other, but the absence of such a surgery would mean the death of both. 
Since the conflicting rights and their weight are the same, how does one resolve the problem 
then? 
Even if the calculation of weight method is to be applied, this approach alone will not lead to 
a different conclusion than the attempts to rank the fundamental rights and establish a 
hierarchy amongst them. Theoretical assumptions as to which right weighs more than the 
other, practically mean prioritizing them according to their value. And considering the fact 
that sometime the clash is between interests protected by the same right, weighing the rights 
falls short of answering the question.  
So the helpfulness of this method in resolving conflicts is also questionable. Since the weight 
of a right cannot be isolated from the circumstances of the incident causing the conflict, the 
factual background appears as an important element, again. 
 
                                                          
32
 Martin, Rawls and Rights, 1985, p. 130. 
33
 Zucca, (fn. 9), p. 23. 
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IV. Human Dignity 
After the Second World War, human dignity became popular in national and international 
human rights texts. 34 Many of the international conventions pointed to human dignity in their 
preambles and/or within their articles. It has become the core value of the United Nations’ 
concept of human rights, which was highlighted by the UN General Assembly stating that all 
new human rights instruments should “derive from the inherent dignity and worth of the 
human person.”35 Some states incorporated the principle into their constitutions, such as 
Spain,36 Greece37 and Israel,38 but perhaps the one which gives human dignity a level of 
significance like no other is Germany. The German Constitution39 considers human dignity as 
“peerless” and as a “supreme value upon which the entire constitutional structure is based.”40 
The most important human rights instrument on the European level, however, does not 
mention human dignity within its text. Even though the ECHR does not expressly include 
human dignity, it was mentioned in later instruments of Council of Europe 41  and the 
Strasbourg Court uses it as a device for the interpretation of the Convention.42 It has also 
been included in Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
Human dignity is considered to be the core of fundamental rights on which all the 
constitutional rights are based.43 It would not be wrong to say that human dignity is the 
mother of fundamental rights. 
So even if it is not mentioned explicitly in any legal text, human dignity somehow finds a way 
to play its role in the legal system. “There is a reasonable consensus that it constitutes a 
fundamental value that underlines constitutional democracies generally, even when not 
expressly written in the constitutions.”44 In legal instruments where there is no mention of 
human dignity within the catalogue of fundamental constitutional rights, nevertheless there is 
a notion that human dignity will still be taken into consideration. Most judicial organs use 
human dignity to interpret the scope and context of rights. On this basis it was suggested that 
considering the closeness of the relation between a certain right and human dignity should 
                                                          
34
 McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, EJIL 2008, pp. 668-671. 
35
 GA Resolution 41/120, 4.12.1989 
36
 Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain, Article 10, 27.12.1978. 
37
 Constitution of the Hellenic Republic, Article 7, 09.06.1975. 
38
 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty of the State of Israel, Articles 1 and 2, 09.03.1994. 
39
 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 1, 23.05.1949. 
40
 Barak, Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right, 2015, p. 231. 
41
 The preamble of Protocol No. 13, which abolishes death penalty, refers to human dignity.  
42
 Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in Contemporary Law and in the 
Transnational Discourse, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 2012, p. 342. 
43
 Jakab, Breaching Constitutional Law on Moral Grounds in the Fight against Terrorism: Implied 
Presuppositions and Proposed Solutions in the Discourse on ‘The Rule of Law vs. Terrorism,’ 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, (Vol. 9), 2011, p. 68. 
44
 Ibid. p. 354. 
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be used as a method of resolving conflicts. Whichever interest is more indispensable in the 
light of human dignity should be protected.45  
Despite the higher value given to the human dignity, it cannot be concluded that human 
dignity will always prevail when it comes into conflict with another constitutional right. When 
considering that human dignity is the source of all fundamental rights, both conflicting rights 
will have a human dignity component. If we say that human dignity will always prevail in case 
of conflict with another fundamental right, what will the solution be in case of conflict between 
two rights with roots in human dignity? 
Rather than saying that human dignity always takes presence over other fundamental rights, 
it would be better to consider human dignity as an interpretative tool.46One could suggest 
looking at both rights and their relation with human dignity and whichever has the closer 
connection should be kept intact. But the closeness of connection and the importance given 
to it would depend on the facts. 
Since fundamental rights will have different weight depending on the circumstances in which 
they face each other, it would be wrong to give absolute precedence to human dignity. 
Fundamental rights should rather be subject to balancing through the proportionality 
principle,47 as will be explained later. 
V.  State Liability 
Another method, which has been suggested by some scholars48 as an alternative, is holding 
the state liable for the failure of protecting constitutional rights. Since it is not possible to keep 
both conflicting rights intact, the responsibility for this outcome and the duty to pay 
compensation must be imposed on the State. This method is based on the view that 
fundamental constitutional rights were developed to protect the individuals from the State. As 
mentioned before, the state also has the positive obligation to protect them from each other. 
This positive obligation’s consequence is that the individual is entitled to obtain such 
protection.49 
Since it is the state’s duty to protect fundamental rights, the appearance of a conflict can be 
seen as the result of the state’s failure to fulfill its obligation. For example in a decision by the 
                                                          
45
 Lutz-Bachmann and Nascimento, Human Rights, Human Dignity and Cosmopolitan Ideals: Essays 
on Critical Theory and Human Rights, 2014, p. 64. 
46
 Habermas, The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights, 
Metaphilosophy, 2010, pp. 464-465. 
47
 Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (translation by Julia Rivers), 2004, pp.47-48.   
48
 Canaris, Grundrechte und Privatrecht, 1999, p.38. 
49
 West, Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and American Constitutionalism, in: Campbell, Protecting 
Human Rights: Instruments and Institutions, 2003, p. 99. 
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African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the state’s positive obligation and 
liability, in case of a failure, was pointed out: 
“The Charter specifies in Article 1 that the States Parties shall not only recognize the rights, 
duties and freedoms adopted by the Charter, but they should also ‘undertake… measures to 
give effect to them’. In other words, if a State neglects to ensure the rights in the African 
Charter, this can constitute a violation, even if the State or its agents are not the immediate 
cause of the violation.”50 
Within this approach, whether or not the state is in violation will be assessed through the 
principle of proportionality, but in a special sense. When the minimum protection which is 
guaranteed by a certain fundamental constitutional right is not respected, the state has failed 
to fulfill its duty. 
“Je höher der Rang des betroffenen Grundrechts, je schwerer der drohende Eingriff, je 
intensiver die Gefahr, je geringer die Möglichkeit seines Trägers zu effizientem Selbstschutz 
und je schwächer das Gewicht gegenläufiger Grundrechte und Interessen ist, desto eher ist 
eine verfassungsrechtliche Schutzplicht zu bejahen.“51  
So the state’s duty will depend on the weight of the fundamental right and on the 
circumstances of the conflict. However, the state liability method is not as practical as it 
seems. As a matter of fact, it is not a method to resolve conflicts, but a way of compensating 
the violation, rather than facing the actual problem. Another issue with this method is that no 
matter how fully the state fulfills its obligations, conflicts between fundamental rights will 
continue to exist. This does not necessarily mean that the state has failed to protect them. 
Even after sufficient protective measures are taken, there will always be situations where 
rights clash and there is no way to avoid it. 
“The obligation to protect is defined as an obligation to take all reasonable measures that 
might have prevented the event from occurring: it is thus an obligation of means, rather than 
an obligation of result. In order to engage the responsibility of the State, it is therefore not 
enough that the event which should have been prevented did occur: it must be shown, in 
addition, that the State could have taken certain measures which might have succeeded to 
prevent the event, and yet failed to take such measures.”52 
                                                          
50
 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication 74/92, Commission Nationale 
des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertes v. Chad, 1995, para. 20. 
51
 Canaris, (fn. 47), p. 80. 
52
 De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary, 2014, p. 428. 
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A conflict which has occurred because of the lack of sufficient measures taken by the state is 
not a genuine conflict of fundamental rights, but rather a spurious one, since it could be 
avoided after all. 
VI. Balancing the Interests 
Since ranking fundamental rights is almost impossible and no common order of hierarchy 
can be achieved, prioritizing one over the other can only be possible in the framework of the 
concrete case. When resolving a conflict between two rights, which are equally protected by 
the relevant text, balancing is the wiser path to take, in order to maintain the sense of justice.  
Balancing is possible through weighing the interests that are to be protected by those 
fundamental rights in conflict with each other, rather than trying to calculate which right itself 
weighs heavier in theory. 
It is obvious that in order to establish a balance, the facts are crucial. Not giving the facts the 
necessary consideration would most likely result in an unjust decision, which would also 
undermine the value of fundamental rights.  
Attaching so much importance to the circumstances of the case does not mean that the 
theoretical considerations are totally irrelevant. The level and nature of the right is also to be 
taken into account, but jointly with the facts.  
“The factors which are considered to be of major importance here are the status of the 
constitutional rights involved, which is primarily determined by whether those rights are 
subject to limitation or not, and the intensity of their infringement.”53 
Whether or not a fundamental right can be subject to limitations is a question that should be 
answered before balancing. There may be cases where one of the fundamental rights is 
subject to limitation and the circumstances legitimate such limitation. In these cases there 
would not be much of a problem, since the solution is already available within the legal text. 
For example a group of people want to demonstrate against the changes the government did 
on its policy towards minorities, however the state received information that this 
demonstration could lead to a terrorist attack. In this case the state would be entitled to forbid 
the demonstration, which is protected under freedom of assembly, in order to protect the 
right to life of several. Since Article 11 of the ECHR provides a limitation clause, there is no 
actual conflict. These kinds of conflicts can be classified as spurious conflicts as in the 
distinction made by Zucca. 
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But when either right cannot be subject to limitation or the situation in which they can be 
limited has not arisen, the conflict should be evaluated through balancing. 
The seriousness or the level of the violation to each fundamental right in question should be 
graded also in order to reach a justifiable and reasonable solution. This is what the 
theoretical ranking method fails to consider. When a higher ranking fundamental right 
conflicts with a lower ranking fundamental right, the answer of this method would be to 
protect the higher right and sacrifice the lower one. But what about the cases where the 
violation of the higher ranking fundamental right is at a minimum level and the lower ranking 
fundamental right has to be subject to total sacrifice in order to save the higher-ranking right? 
Can this approach be considered as reasonable? 
The examination of the level of infringement to each fundamental right would ensure a proper 
balance and a higher potential of satisfaction on both sides. This can be managed through 
the application of the proportionality principle. As one judge has said; 
“Application of the principle of proportionality is in my view a means of examining whether the 
decision meets the test of reasonableness.” 54 
The principle of proportionality is addressed in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
Article 52§1: 
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by this Charter must be 
provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the 
principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely 
meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights 
and freedoms of others. 
Although Article 52§1 regulates the limitations made by the legislator and is not directly about 
the conflicts of fundamental rights, it nevertheless shows a certain guideline when limitation 
of a fundamental right is the issue.  
The ECtHR’s case law on limitation of the Convention rights points to a similar method which 
emphasizes the proportionality. “The Strasbourg organs have consistently held that the 
principle of proportionality is inherent in evaluating the right of an individual person and the 
general public interests of society. This means that a fair or reasonable balance must be 
attained between those two countervailing interests.”55 
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The Supreme Court of Canada, as well, shares the same opinion that conflicts between 
fundamental rights should be dealt with through balancing, so that a harmonization amongst 
them could be established.56 
In general, both national and international human rights systems deal with the conflict of 
fundamental rights and public interests in the same manner. It can be said that balancing is a 
commonly accepted approach, as a “near-universal feature of the structure of constitutional 
rights throughout the contemporary world.”57 Since the public interest in essence means, so 
to say, the fundamental rights of the society, it would be reasonable to expect the courts to 
apply the same method when resolving a conflict between two individuals’ fundamental 
rights, which they have done very often. 
Balancing has “a key function in the jurisprudence of constitutional courts and is often 
unavoidable in solving conflicts between fundamental rights. As conflicting rights cannot 
always be fully reconciled, the courts are forced to conduct a balancing exercise. And, 
fundamental rights hardly ever have an absolute character; they are generally a codification 
of general principles of law, an application which can be limited. The courts, before which 
fundamental rights have been invoked, are therefore forced to adjudicate on these conflicting 
rights and to make a decision.”58 
Considering the fundamental rights in a flexible relationship with each other, rather than 
strictly prioritizing, would be a more constructive approach to establish a balance, since the 
dependency of the solution to the facts indicates that “sometimes one and sometimes 
another constitutional right will weigh heavier.”59 
The flexibility of the relationship between fundamental rights has been pointed out by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court as follows: 
“Da beide Interessen durch Grundrechte geschützt sind, von denen keines den anderen 
generell vorgeht, hängt die Entscheidung davon ab, welche Beeinträchtigung im Rahmen 
des vom Gesetzgeber abstrakt vorgenommen Interessenausgleich im konkreten Fall 
schwerer wiegt.”60 
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The German Federal Constitutional Court uses a theory developed by Professor Konrad 
Hesse named praktische Konkordanz (practical concordance) when facing conflicts. Practical 
Concordance is a “canon that holds that protected constitutional values must be harmonized 
with one another when they conflict,,, it requires the optimization of competing rights. In 
short, one constitutional value may not be realized at the expense of a competing 
constitutional value. In the German view, constitutional interpretation is not a zero-sum 
game´… Professor Hesse wrote, ‘The principle of the Constitution’s unity requires the 
optimization of [values in conflict]: Both legal values need to be limited so that each can 
attain its optimal effect. In each concrete case, therefore, the limitations must satisfy the 
principle of proportionality; that is, they may not go any further than necessary to produce a 
concordance of both legal values.’”61  
To reach a harmony among the rights and to optimize their values is only possible through 
the assessment of each individual case, which shows that the German Federal Constitutional 
Court also uses the balancing method. 
Resolving the conflict by balancing the interests in each individual case has been called by 
one author “ad hoc balancing”62, which has two aspects: firstly the consideration of the very 
essence/core of the fundamental right, secondly the consideration of the circumstances of 
the case63, which summarizes this method shortly. 
The court, here, will have to examine both conflicting fundamental rights, how severe the 
interests have been damaged and the circumstances under which the situation occurred, and 
then establish a balance in between the interests that would serve the purposes of justice, 
uphold the value of fundamental rights and is based on reason. 
D. How Does the ECtHR Deal with Conflicting Convention 
Rights? 
First of all it has to be made clear that the Strasbourg Court deals with the conflicts between 
the individuals and the State. Since the restriction of fundamental rights based on 
governmental power are not within the scope of this paper, the reference is aimed only to 
give a general picture of the approach of the ECtHR, since it is the most important 
international authority on human rights in Europe. 
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When it is faced with a conflict, the ECtHR uses the limitation clauses enshrined in the 
second paragraphs of Articles 8 to 11 ECHR, particularly the phrase “the rights and freedoms 
of others” as a key instrument.64 The cases which involve the limitation clauses are not 
always between two rights protected under the Convention, 65  which are nevertheless, 
through the interpretation of the ECtHR, included under the term of “rights and freedoms of 
others.” Most of the time, however, the subject of the limitation clauses is actually a right 
protected by the Convention. So the ECtHR is indirectly able to rule on conflicts between 
fundamental rights concerning two individuals. For example in the case Otto-Preminger-
Institut v. Austria, the Strasbourg Court accepted the prohibition of a film to protect “the rights 
of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings by the public expression of views of 
other persons”, 66 which was conflicting with the freedom of expression. In another case, 
where the right to privacy and freedom of expression was in conflict, the Court accepted the 
ban on a book, which was giving intimate details of an individual’s private life.67 
The Court’s approach on conflicting fundamental rights is supportive of the balancing 
method, which can be seen in the following statement: 
“In the present case the only aim invoked by the Government to justify the interference 
complained of was “protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. Where these “rights and 
freedoms” are themselves among those guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols, it 
must be accepted that the need to protect them may lead States to restrict other rights or 
freedoms likewise set forth in the Convention. It is precisely this constant search for a 
balance between the fundamental rights of each individual which constitutes the foundation 
of a “democratic society”. The balancing of individual interests that may well be contradictory 
is a difficult matter, and Contracting States must have a broad margin of appreciation in this 
respect, since the national authorities are in principle better placed than the European Court 
to assess whether or not there is a “pressing social need” capable of justifying interference 
with one of the rights guaranteed by the Convention. 
It is a different matter where restrictions are imposed on a right or freedom guaranteed by the 
Convention in order to protect “rights and freedoms” not, as such, enunciated therein. In such 
a case only indisputable imperatives can justify interference with enjoyment of a Convention 
right.”68 
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The margin of appreciation was gradually developed in the Court’s jurisprudence and has for 
a long time not actually had a place in the text of the Convention. Only the Protocol No. 15 
amending the Convention of 24 June 2013, which is not yet in force, will introduce the 
“margin of appreciation” concept into the preamble of the Convention. The margin of 
appreciation is the “measure of discretion allowed the Member States in the manner in which 
they implement the Convention’s standards, taking into account their own particular national 
circumstances and conditions.”69  
The emphasis on the margin of appreciation is due to the fact that the national courts will be 
able to establish a more reasonable and justified balance, since they are more familiar with 
the factual background of the case and the concrete conditions in the particular Convention 
State than the Strasbourg Court. “The underlying principle is that state authorities are in a 
better position than an international judge to decide the proper application of the Convention 
to specific contexts…”70 The necessity71 of a certain restriction on a right can be better 
assessed on the national level. 
The balancing method depends on the evaluation of the facts and what meaning or weight is 
given to the conflicting rights within a specific jurisdiction, which depends on culture, 
economy, history, politics and so on. This is why the Court, with the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, by giving some general guidelines as to the rules that should be followed,72 leaves it 
to the discretion of national courts to make the final decision on the proper balance. 
However, the Court has also always emphasized that the Convention States’ use of their 
margin of appreciation remains subject to its supervision. 
E. Conclusion 
After examining the methods listed above, one can say that the only logical method that will 
help us reach a reasonable solution for the conflict of fundamental rights is balancing. It is 
the most common method used across the world in different legal orders and the one 
receiving the most support in the legal literature. 
The criticism that the balancing method had received was that it leaves the judges a broad 
discretion and there is no way of foreseeing the judgment that would be given.73  
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The discretion that the judges enjoy when applying the balancing method is a part of their 
duty as the guardians of law. One general rule which embraces all of the situations in which 
a conflict occurs and gives a common technique to resolve them all cannot possibly be 
formulated. Even if a single solution was to be formulated. It would not serve justice in each 
situation, since every case has its own specific circumstances. Also the discretion of the 
judges is not without any limits; they have to follow the principle of proportionality. 
The answer to the question, how to resolve conflicts between fundamental constitutional 
rights, is, at the end quite simple. Balancing …  
22 
 
Bibliography 
Alexy, Robert A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (translation by Julia Rivers), 2004, 
Oxford 
 
Amien, Waheeda Muslim Personal Law (MPL) In Canada: A Case Study Considering 
the Conflict Between Freedom of Religion and Muslim Womend’s 
Right to Equality, in: E Brems (Ed.), Conflicts Between Fundamental 
Rights, 2008, pp. 381-420, Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia 
 
Arai, Yutaka Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the 
Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR, 2002, 
Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia 
 
Barak, Aharon Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right, 
2015, Cambridge Universtiy Press 
 
Barroso, 
Luis Roberto 
Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in Contemporary Law 
and in the Transnational Discourse, in: Boston College International 
and Comperative Law Review, 35/2012 pp. 331-393 
 
Blaesing, Heiner Grundrechtskollisionen, 1974, Bochum 
 
Bribosia, 
Emmanuelle/ 
Rorive, Isabelle 
In the Search of a Balance Between the Right to Equality and other 
Fundamental Rights, European Commission, Directorate-General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Unit G.2, 2010, 
Luxembourg 
 
Bomhoff, Jacco  ‘The Rights and Freedom of Others’: The ECHR and Its Peculiar 
Category of Conflicts Between Individual Fundamental Rights, in E 
Brems (Ed.), Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights, 2008, pp. 619-
654, Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia 
 
Briffault, Richard Review: The Contested Right to Vote, Michigan Law Review,  The 
Michigan Law Review Association, 100/2002 
 
  
23 
 
Canaris,  
Claus-Wilhelm 
 
Grundrechte und Privatrecht, 1999, Berlin New York 
Cherednychenko, 
Olha O. 
Fundamental Rights, Contract Law and the Protection of the Weaker 
Party: A Comparative Analysis of the Constitutionalisation of Contract 
Law, with Emphasis on Risky Financial Transactions, 2007, München 
 
Desai, Murli A Rights-Based Preventative Approach for Psychosocial Well-being in 
Childhood, Children’s Well-being: Indicators and Research, 2010, 
Springer Science & Business Media 
 
De Schutter, Olivier International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary, 
2014, Cambridge 
 
De Vries, Syba A. Balancing Fundamental Rights with Economic Freedoms According to 
the European Court of Justice, Ultrecht Law Review, 9/2013, pp. 169-
192 
 
Elver, Hilal The Headscarf Controversy: Secularism and Freedom of Religion, 
2012, Oxford 
 
Freeden, Michael Rights, 1991, Open University Press 
 
Gardbaum, Stephen Limiting Constitutional Rights, UCLA Law Review, 24/2007. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=971024, 01.09.2015  
 
Glendon, Marry Ann Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse, 1991, New 
York, The Free Press 
 
Gordon, Daniel Why Is There No Headscarf Affair in the United States?, Historical 
Reflections, 34/2008, pp. 37-60 
 
Habermas, Jürgen The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human 
Rights, Metaphilosophy, 41/2010, pp. 464-480 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Jakab, András Breaching Constitutional Law on Moral Grounds in the Fight Against 
Terrorism: Implied Presuppositions and Proposed Solutions in the 
Discourse on ‘The Rule of Law vs. Terrorism,’ International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, 9/ 2011, pp. 58-78 
 
Kommers & Miller The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
3rd ed., 2012, Duke University Press 
 
Lutz-Bachmann, 
Matthias/ 
Nascimento, Amos 
 
Human Rights, Human Dignity and Cosmopolitan Ideals: Essays on 
Critical Theory and Human Rights, 2014, Ashgate 
Mackie, J. L. Rights, Utility and Universalization in: R. G. Frey (Ed), Utility and 
Rights, 1985, pp. 86-105, Basic Blackwell 
 
McBride, Jeremy Proportionality and the European Convention on Human Rights, in: 
Ellis, The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe, 1999, pp. 
23-36, Hart 
 
McCrudden, 
Christopher 
 
Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, in: the 
European Journal of International Law, EJIL 19/2008, p. 655-724 
Meron, Theodor On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, American Journal of 
International Law, 80/1986 
 
Quint, Peter E. Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 
Maryland Law Reviıew, Vol. 49, Issue 2, pp. 247-349, 1989. 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol48/iss2/3, 15.10.2012 
 
Robinson, Mary United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Second Annual 
BP Lecture on Human Rights and Global Civilisation, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/AFD931913249074EC1
256B17002C27BF?opendocument, 29.11.2001 
 
Smet, Stin Freedom of Expression and the Right to Reputation: Human Rights in 
Conflict, in: American University International Law Review, 26/2010, 
pp. 183-236 
25 
 
 
Tümay, Murat The “Margin of Appreciation Doctrine” Developed by the Case-Law of 
the European Court of Human Rights, Ankara Law Review 5-2/2008, 
pp. 201-234 
 
West, Robin Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and American Constitutionalism, in: 
Campbell, Goldsworthy & Stone, Protecting Human Rights: 
Instruments and Institutions, pp. 93-116,  2003, Oxford University 
Press 
 
Xu, Xiaobing/ 
Wilson, George D. 
 
On Conflict of Human Rights, Pierce Law Review, 5/2006 
Zucca, Lorenzo Conflicts of Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Dilemmas, in E 
Brems (Ed.), Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights, pp. 19-38, 2008, 
Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia 
 
 
Court Judgments 
 
Judgments of the Court of Justice 
 
Case C-5/88 Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für 
Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft 
 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:321 
 
Case C-11/70, Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
 
ECLI:EU:C:1970:114 
 
Case C-4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und 
Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the 
European Communities 
 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:51 
Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und  
Automatenausstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürger-
meisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:614 
26 
 
 
Case C-29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm                  
– Sozialamt 
ECLI:EU:C:1969:57 
 
 
Judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States 
 
Supreme Court of the United States, Clarence 
Brandenburg v. State of Ohio 
395 U.S. 444, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 
430, 1969 U.S. LEXIS 1367. 
 
Supreme Court of the United States, Estelle T. 
Griswold and C. Lee Buxton v. Connecticut 
381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 
2d 510, 1965 U.S. LEXIS 2282 
 
Supreme Court of the United States, Jane 
Roe, et al. v. Henry Wade, District Attorney of 
Dallas County 
410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 
2d 147, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 159 
 
 
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
 
ECtHR, application no. 8734/79 Barthold v. Germany, judgment of 25 
March 1985 
 
ECtHR, application no. 25088/94, 28331/95 
and 28443/95 
Chassagnou and Others v. France, 
judgment of 29 April 1999 
 
ECtHR, application no. 27058/05 Dogru v. France, judgment of 4 
December 2008 
 
ECtHR, application no. 58148/00 Editions Plon v. France, judgment of 18 
May 2004 
 
 
27 
 
ECtHR, application no. 5493/72 Handyside v. United Kingdom, 
judgement of 7 December 1976 
 
ECtHR, application no. 44774/98 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, judgment of 10 
November 2005 
 
ECtHR, application no. 16798/90 Lopez Ostra v. Spain, judgement of 9 
December 1994 
 
ECtHR, application no. 13470/87 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 
judgment of 20 September 1994, para. 
48 
 
ECtHR, application no. 1474/62 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 
1994/63; 2126/64, Case “Relating to 
Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use 
of Languages in Education in Belgium” 
v. Belgium (Merits), judgment of 23 July 
1968 
 
ECtHR, application no. 34369/97 Thlimmenos v. Greece, judgment of 6  
April 2000 
 
Others 
 
African Commission on Human  
and Peoples’ Rights 
Communication 74/92, Commission  
Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et 
des Libertes v. Chad, 1995 
 
German Federal Constitutional Court Parabolantanne I, BVerfG 9 Februar 
1994, BVerfG 90, 27 
 
28 
 
 
Supreme Court of Ireland Meadow v. Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform, Murray CJ, 
2010 IESC 3 
 
